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MAIN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 










The European crisis has triggered a series of economic, political and 
social consequences  in  the  European  Union,  particularly  for  the  
euro  zone  member states and this has generated a public discussion 
about the pertinence of a single currency. This paper presents some of 
the social, political and economic consequences. One of the main 
consequences of the crisis in peripheral countries is  higher  
unemployment.  The  political  reconfiguration  at  the  national-level  in 
some European countries is presented. The pressures on labor 
markets are high and there is a reconfiguration in the immigration and 
emigration in Europe. 
 





1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic, political and social consequences of the crises have 
been present  in most  member  states  but particularly  in peripheral  countries  
such  as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. An increase in public debts, a 
boost in the risk premium, high unemployment, political instability and a 
change in migration patterns  are among  the challenges  that peripheral  euro 
zone member  states are facing. 
The  European  economic  governance  has  failed  to  find  prompt  
and adequate solutions in the wake of the economic crises. Diverse instruments 
and mechanism have been setup to reduce the negativ effects and help the 
countries in  need.  The  economic  consequences   are widespread  and  the  
bailouts  have 
assisted  in  stabilizing  some  financial  systems  but  have  failed  to  thwart  
the economic downturn. 
 
This  paper  analyzes  the  main  economic,  politica   and  social 
consequences of the crises in peripheral countries by emphasizing some of the 
internal and external issues as well as the system failures that were present and 
released a spillover effect. The governments of these countries and their 
citizens are  suffering  the  ample  consequences  of  the  crises  and  are,  in  
some  cases, frustrated by the slow and inadequate response by international 
and European institutions. 
 
2. MAIN   ECONOMIC   CONSEQUENCES   OF   THE   
EUROPEAN CRISIS 
The European  Union  (EU) is facing  one of the worst economic  
crises over  the  past  60  years  of  history.  The  current  crisis  has  placed  the  
EU  in  a vulnerable   position   to  international   investors   and  demonstrated   
the  system failures of an incomplete  Monetary Union. The European 
economic governance has been seriously questioned for its lack of reaction 
towards recent problems. 
The current  crisis is the product  of two crises: the financial  crisis 
that began in September  2008 with the Lehman  Brothe s’  bankruptcy  in the 
United States (US) which rapidly spread to the rest of the world, and the 
sovereign debt crisis  that  initiated  in  October  2009  when  the  former  
Greek  Prime  Minister Georgios  Papandreou  stated that the Greek public 
deficit was higher than what had been announced  months  before by the 
previous  prime minister.  The 2009- 
2012  period  has  been  catastrophic  for  the  EU  in  general,  but  mainly  for  
the peripheral countries because they have fallen into an economic downturn. 
The launch of the euro impacted on the risk associated with each of 
the countries  belonging  to the  euro  area,  i.e.  there  was  a convergence  in 
the  risk premium among all members of the Economic Monetary Union 
(EMU). In order to enter the EMU, euro area members have to pass economic 
tests, in addition to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) restricted public 
deficits, but the different characteristics  of the economies of the euro-zone do 
not correspond to the same risk. 
Interest rates on bonds of euro zone governments  converged from 
1995 to1999. Since 1999, the risk associated with the bonds of euro zone 
governments was practically the same. The fact is that although 12 countries 
share the same currency,  their  economies  do not  necessarily  have  the  same  
conditions.  There were economies like Germany and Finland with high 
competitiveness, which contrasted to others like Grece and Spain with low 
competitiveness. 
In the late 2008, the credit fell and investors observed very closely 
the public  finances  of  governments.  From  2009  the  risk  premium  
increased  for peripheral countries like Greece, Irland, Portugal and to a 
lesser extent, Italy and Spain, but in summer of 2012, the risk premium  of 
the latter countries  reached record levels. The European Central Bank 
(ECB)'s decision to buy an unlimited 
debt in the secondary market in September of 2012 has helped to reduce the 
risk premium of the peripheral countries of the euro zone, so that for the first 
quarter of 2013, there has been a significant decrease in the risk premium. 
The  economies  of  Ireland  and  Spain  have  already  been  bailed  out  
in order  to  stabilize  their  financial  systems,  in  the  case  of  Spain  
specifically  its "Cajas",  while  the bailouts  inGreece  and  Portugal  have  
been  implemented  to generate     solvency,     because     these    economies     
did    not    have    enough liquidity to cover the payment of short-term 
bonds. In all four cases the bailouts were implemented after a significant 
increase in the risk premium. 
Before the financial crisis broke, the euro zone economy was growing 
around 2% per year. However, in 2009 there was a drop of the economic 
activity of 4%  (Figure  1). Figure  1 shows  the economic  growth  in the 
euro  zone  and forecasts  for  2013.  This  figure  illustrates  how  after  the  
fall  in  the  economic activity  of 2009, there was nother with a lesser 
extent in 2012, the latter as a result of the sovereign debt crisis in peripheral 
countries. According to the International  Monetary Fund, the forecast of 




Figure1. Economic growth in the euro zone and forecasts from 2013 to 
2016 




Some experts have mentioned that economic crisis in the euro zone 
is a result of high spending in recent years. However, when comparing debt 
(% GDP) in the euro zone with the US, from 2000 to 2008 the euro zone debt 
has remained stable (Figure 2). The increase in debt, as a result of the 
financial crisis in late 
2008, has been lower in the euro zone than in the US, so that argument  is 
not entirely valid. 
 
Figure 2. Government debt (% GDP) in the US and the Euro 
area 




Public debt in the euro area members varies considerably to euro zone 
average. Figure 3 shows the public debt (% GDP) of some euro zone members. 
Countries like Greece and Italy have owed public debt with values close to 
100% (% GDP), since 2000 while other countries in Fgure 3 have had 
values close to 
60%  until  2008.  With  the  financial  crisis  almost  all  countries  increased  
their public  debt,  however,  countries  like  Greec ,  Ireland,  Spain  and  
Portugal  had sharp  increases.  The  sovereign  debt  problem  is  not  that  
the  euro  zone  has overspent, but some peripheral countries recorded 
increases in public debt. 
The US is not exempted of some states spending more than the 
average. However,  the difference  from the EU is that there is an adjustment  
mechanism that serves the states with economic troubles, whereas in the EU 
there is no such mechanism.  The  US  has  a  centralized  budget  that  is  
more  than  20%  of  its economy, while the EU’s budget is 1% (fiscal policy 
remains at national level). Although the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
was created, it cannot be compared to the adjustment chanisms that exist in 
the US. 
 
Figure 3. Government debt (% GDP) of some Euro area 
countries 




The impact of the sovereign debt crisis has hit European countries 
differently. On the issue of unemployment is where th  greatest differences 
were noticed in the euro zone, because labor markets in the euro zone have 
different degrees  of  flexibility  (Bernal-Verdugo,  Furceri  &  Guillaume,  
2012).  Figure  4 shows that Spain and Greece had high unemployment  rates 
in 2012, with levels close to 25%, while Germany had an unemployment rate 
very close to 5%. Figure 
4 also shows that from 2008 there has been a substantial increase in the 
unemployment   rate  in  countries  like  Spain,  Greece  and  Portugal,  while  
in Germany the unemployment rate decreased. 
 
Figure 4. Unemployment rate of some Euro area 
countries 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 
2013. 
 
Table  1 shows  the current  and projected  unemployment  rates  in 
2013 and 2014. The euro area will have an increase in the unemployment rate 
in 2014, but  other  countries  will  have  a  reduction  from  -0.87  (United  
States)  to  -0.04 (Japan). Therefore, in 2014 the un mployment will remain a 
great issue across Europe. 
Table 1. Unemployment rates 
 
Country / Date Current (May 2013) Projected (Q4 2014) Change (points) 
United States 7.60 6.73 -0.87 
Canada 7.10 6.71 -0.39 
OECD 8.01 7.85 -0.16 
Japan 4.10 4.06 -0.04 
Euro area 12.20 12.26 0.06 
Source: OECD Short-Term Labor Market Statistics 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/lfs- lms-data-en)  and  OECD  Economic  Outlook  
Databases (http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eo-data-en). 
 
The underlying problem in the euro zone is the competitive gap among 
member states. Figure 5 shows that Unit Labor Costs (ULC) vary significantly 
in the  euro  area  because   while  in  Germany   the ULC  have  been  
decreasing considerably in the last decade hence beoming one of the most 
competitive countries, in Spain, Greece, Ireland and Italy their ULC have 
increased in the last decade. Since 2009, most countries  in Figure 5 show a 
significant  reduction  of 
ULC. The difference in the competitiveness  of euro area countries is 
significant, and it is one of the variables that explain the vulnerability in that 
area. 
Although  members  of  the  euro  zone  share  the same  currency,  
the economic  and financial  results  are different,  so that the financial  
problem  of a small country affects the entire euro zone, while in the US, 
financial problems or competitiveness gap in the state  has no effect on the 
whole country because there is an adjustment mechanism on a centralized 
budget, which is much greater than in the EU. 
 
 
Figure 5. Unit Labor Costs (nominal) of some euro area countries 
Source: AMECO Database, European Commission 
 
The issue of moral hazard has been mentioned in the bailouts that have 
occurred  in  the  euro  zone  (Jones  (2010);  De  Grauwe,  2011b).  Countries  
that provide  money  for bailouts,  like  Germany,  have  no incentive  to grant  
money, because it creates the risk of generating bad behavior in countries that 
receive the money.  The  outcome  shows  that  there  is  moral  hazard:  
solidarity  is  more complicated when the Federal State does not have a 
centralized budget. Gros & Mayer (2010) suggest the creation of the European 
Monetary Fund, as a measure to bail out European countries. Others authors 
have highlighted that Europe needs some  kind  of  Political  Union  (De  
Grauwe,  2011a)  and  the  joint  issue  of Eurobonds. 
 
The response of the European institutions  has varied over time and 
has been differentiated. On the one hand, the ECB implemented programs to 
provide liquidity and to reduce the interest rate from the beginning of the 
financial crisis. When  the  sovereign  debt  crisis  began,  the  ECB  bought  
government  bonds  to reduce  risk premium,  whereas  in September  of 2012 
the president  of the ECB 
bought the debt without limit, reducing the risk premium. On the other hand, 
the institutional  response  to stop  public  debt  was  the  Treaty  on Stability, 
Coordination  and Governance,  which further restricts the range of public 
deficit of the euro zone countries. 
Since 2010, the Troika (the ECB, the European Commission and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) insisted in implem nting austerity policies 
to the bailed out countries, however there was a chnge of discourse where 
austerity measures were requested for longer periods and with flexibility. The 
serious economic problems of Spain and Greece have c used a relaxation of 
the Troika in the pursuit of austerity. 
 
 
3.  POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EUROPEAN 
CRISIS 
 
The citizens of the EU have suffered the consequences  generated  
from the global  financial  crisis  (US),  the banking  crisis  (Ireland),  and the 
sovereign debt crisis (Greece), among others. The economic and political 
decisions taken by government officials have had important repercussions in 
the quality of their life style. Citizens and politic ans protested against the 
austerity measures and as consequence, in some countries, their heads of state 
or government had to resign. 
The economic crisis has unleashed many debates in the academic 
world but few have discussed about the political consequences at the internal 
and international level. In particular, we briefly analyze in this section what 
happened in Portugal,  Ireland,  Greece,  Italy and Romania  to highlight  the 
impact  on the internal policy of the aforementioned events. 
Since the beginning of the crisis the Portuguese  government  had 
stated that  they  would  not  resort  to  a  EU  bailout.  In  March  2010,  the  
Portuguese Parliament approved the first SGP that included a reduction in 
social spending, an increase  in taxes for the wealthy  and privatization  of 
public companies,  among others. Two months later, the Prime Minister of 
Portugal, Jose Socrates, was able to overcome  a censure  motion  presented  
by the Marxist  left politicians  for his 
crisis measures. In March 11th, 2011, he presented his 4th  austerity plan that 
was 
rejected by the opposition and provoked the resignat o  of his 
government. 
 
While  still  in  function,  in  April  2011,  Jose  Socrates  requested  
the activation of a EU bailout, and formally began to negotiate with the IMF 
and the EU. On May the 3rd, the Portuguese Prime Minister announced that 
the IMF-EU bailout rose up to €78 billion for three y ars. Nevertheless,  the 
political tensions 
generated by the crisis became an insuperable obstacle for Socrates’ 
government. The Portuguese crisis broke off the day before the approval of 
the new Financial Stability Mechanisms in the euro zone. 
In 2008, the fiscal banking crisis affected Ireland. Brian Cowen’s 
management  as  first  Prime  Minister  of  the  Irish  Republic  coincided  with  
the financial and banking crisis of his country. The government tried by all 
means to avoid  asking  for  external  aid.  The  euro  zone  members  offered  
financial  aid, 
however Cowen wanted to avoid a reform package with h s creditors, which 
was a requisite associated to the bailout mechanism approved by the EU. 
Cowen had to abandon his first position due to the fear of the aid-associated 
demands. On November 22nd, 2010, the by then Prime Minister of Ireland 
announced that the government had to increase taxes nd lower expense to 
admissible levels. 
Ireland had to be bailed out on November 2010 for 85 billion euros 
by the IMF and the EU in order to underpin its banking sector. After 
accepting the IMF-EU bailout, the Irish government sank, leaving the Prime 
Minister’s position unsustainable.   According  to  a  poll  in  Ireland,  the  
bailout  reached  historical minimums with only 8%1 of satisfaction to the 
government’s performance. To the Irish people, a bailout means national 
humiliation, betrayal and to surrender their 
autonomy  to the European  Commission,  the ECB andthe IMF. Hence, 
Cowen turned in his resignation and called snap elections. 
In April 2010, the then Prime Minister of Greece, Georgios 
Papandreou, heir to a political dynasty, sought support from his European 
partners to reduce an   inherited   debt.   During   the   crisis,   Brussels   fiercely   
pushed   the   Greek government to approve the bailout deal. The Greek 
people, outraged by cuts and austerity measures, protested in the streets and 
organized general strikes. The first bailout was not enough so a second bailout 
was necessary. 
In this precise context, Papandreou expressed his intent on to hold a 
referendum on the European bailout plan and the membership of Greece in the 
Eurozone. The Greek Prime Minister was confident tha e vote would confirm 
Greece as a member of the EU. 
The internal and external reaction was immediate to Papandreou’s 
announcement; it generated a market panic as well as anger from its European 
partners. Particularly,  Germany and France pushed t  Greek Prime Minister 
to return to the original plans of the bailout. Finally, Georgios Papandreou  
backed off to the international  pressure.  This failure and abandonment  of 
his initiative forced him to resign to reach an agreement to form a new unity 
government in Greece. 
In 2011, the Italian economy had been growing at 0.3% and public 
debt rose above 120% of GDP2. In November 2011, the then Prime Minister 
of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi,  immersed  in lawsuits  for fraud and sex scandals  
resigned  as 
Prime Minister of Italy after the EU and the markets forced him to resign in 
order to support  the Italian crisis in return. Indee ,  the European  crisis had 
achieved what  the  Italian  liberal  parties  had  f iled  to  accomplish:  to  end  
the  reign  of Berlusconi on the Italian political scene. 
Having lost the parliamentary majority, Berlusconi announced he 
would resign his position after the budgets with the adjustments required by 
Brussels for 
2012 were approved. No doubt the strong action of the president of Italy, 
Giorgio 




2 Eurostat. Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en
&pcode=tsdd e410&plugin=1 
Berlusconi’s  exit  of  power.  Until  the  end,  after  17  years  in  Italian  
politics, Berlusconi kept the tension in a country where the economic and 
political times are difficult. 
The  crisis  strongly  affected  Romania,  which  requested  a  loan  of  
20 billion euros to the ECB, IMF and EU. The adjustment measures applied by 
the Romanian Prime Minister, Emil Boc, included: to reduce by a quarter the 
salaries of  civil  servants  and  to  raise  VAT,  among  others.  These  measures  
were  well received by the EU and the IMF, but strongly rejected by the 
Romanians. Consequently, Emil Boc resigned to the mass protests that rejected 
the austerity measures backed by the International Monetary Fund. 
The internal and external pressures have created tensions in the 
political level, mainly in European governments  and some of them have not 
resisted the attack. The situation is critical and the forced departure of 
governments has failed to reduce the effects of the European crisis. In some 
cases, it has had the opposite effect than the expected and has worsened the 
political crisis. Undoubtedly, the European crisis has shown the fragility of the 
system and has claimed victims in its wake, overthrowing governments. 
With the looming threat of contagion and the uncertainty of the euro, 
European leaders decided to bailout the indebted countries like Greece. 
Countries like Germany initially disagreed with other Eurozone members with 
regard to the collective rescue of Greece. Germany’s position was simple: to 
exclude from the Eurozone those countries, which did not respect the rules and 
threaten the euro. However,   the  European   Commission   along   with  
countries   such  as  France pressured  the  German  Chancellor  to  reach  an  
agreement.  Later,  France  and Germany  agreed  a  plan  to  bailout  Greece  
with  the  IMF  and  the  Eurozone countries. 
The crisis revealed shortcomings in the functioning of the Eurozone: 
The level  of political  and  economic  integration  to support  the  euro  is 
insufficient; there is lack of cooperation among the members of the euro zone; a 
tool to appropriately manage any crises was non-exist nt; there was a lack of 
control and supervision   of  the  European   Commission   on  the  Public  
Accounts   member countries. 
At  the  European  Council  in  2011,  the  17  memb rs  of  the  
Eurozone, along with the countries, which aspired to join the EU, agreed to 
sign a new treaty that would put strict limits on spending and government 
borrowing with penalties for those governments that violated the limits. The 
other members of the EU were prepared to join the treaty, subject to 
parliamentary vote, except for the UK. 
The   Euro   group’s3     role   as   coordinator   and   European   economic 
governance body has become more important since the European crisis broke 
off. The Troika  has imposed  austerity  measures  to the bailed  out 
governments;  its mission   is   to   monitor   the   fulfillment   of   the   
program   according   to   its commitments.  Both  actors  play  an  important  
role  in  decision-making  bodies, 
 
 
3 Meeting of the finance ministers of the EU: The ECB President, Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Commissioner  and the Chairman of the Eurogroup Working Group. 
control and monitoring of the agreements reached at the respective bailouts 
environment requested by the European governments. 
In  the  European  political  scene,  substantial  changes  can  be  
observed before  and after the European  crisis.  The European  political  
reconfiguration  is partly  explained  by the changes  that arose  as a result  of 
internal  and  external political pressures. Some governments were overthrown 
by strikes and protests, others lost the support of their coalition governments, 
and some succumbed to external political pressures. 
 
 
4.  CRISIS, UNEMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRANT 
WORKERS 
 
International migration is a global phenomenon that is growing in 
complexity, effect, and scope, and Europe is no exception. Most economies in 
the world   are   simultaneously   countries   of   origin,   transit   and   
destination,   for thousands of international  migrants. Traditional immigration  
patterns are fuelled by changing demographic, economic, political and social 
conditions (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwai, 2010). These patterns affect the size 
and structure of immigrant population as well as societies, markets and 
economies in countries of origin and destination. And Europe has been a key 
part of these dynamics. 
The  global   financial   crisis  at  the  end  of  2008  severely   
disrupted economic growth and caused significant setbacks affecting migration 
patterns worldwide. According to the International Labor Organization 
(Awad, 2009), the current crisis will cost 20 million jobs worldwide, forcing 
individual migrants to go back home and discouraging  those potential 
migrants.  Under this panorama, labor markers are observing an increasingly 
job competition between natives and migrants. 
The  current  context  observes   a  world  economy   slowly  
recovering, fostered  mainly  by  developing  and  emerging  economies  
performance  (Martin, 
2009). Most developed  countries  are still struggling  and there is not a 
specific date for a complete recovery. This slowdown has had many different 
effects. In the case of Europe, most economies shift to a fiscal austerity 
scenario to reduce expenses and future debt commitments. 
This  context  has created  a new  “jobless  scenario”  with  economic  
and social pressures around. OECD (2009) considered that it would take 
another five years  before  employment  and  labor  demand  are  back  to pre-
slowdown  levels. Martin (2009) considered  that large developing  and 
emerging economies  would be  leading  the  world  post-crisis  recovery.  Asia  
and  Latin  American  are  key regions for this future scenario. 
Southern European countries are among the areas highly affected by 
the crises. At the end of 2010, the native population began to struggle with 
unemployment and the impossibility to cover the monthly mortgages payments, 
increasing  the risk of losing their homes.  This new scenario  increases  
pressure over the local economies, reducing the prospect for growth and 
development. Unemployment  became a threat to the economy  and social 
stability.  Immigrant 
populations in Europe have been suffering rising unemployment  levels, 
doubling the impact observed on native population (Ratha, Mohapatra and 
Silwai, 2010). 
Immigration  flows  to Europe  have  noticeably  slowed  in the last 
year, raising essential questions about the effect the current global economic 
crisis is having on inflows and return migration (Pajares, 2009). These questions 
appear particularly  overwhelming  because  there  has  been  no comparable  
recession  in recent decades. The economic crisis has had an impact on both 
immigration and emigration flows in Europe (Awad, 2009). Immigration 
levels have slowed while emigration has increased in some EU countries. 
During the global economic downturn emigration leves of non-European 
residents increased in some EU countries, still uncear how many have returned 
to their home country or migrated to other destinations within or outside 
Europe. 
 
At the beginning of 2000, about 20 million persons were unemployed 
in the EU-27, around 9% of the total labor force. By 2012 the 
unemployment  rate for the Euro area-17 reached 11.8%. One of the most 
affected labor markets in Europe  is  Spain,  by  2009  more  than  4  million  
people  were  unemployed; representing 18% of the active population, and the 
unemployment rate for natives was  nearly  16%  and 28%  for  foreigners   
(Urso  and  Schuster,   2013).  The prospective is that the unemployment rate 
could be higher without increasing emigration. In 201  more than 280,00 
Spaniards moved out of their home communities  looking  for jobs. The 
difference  between  the unemployment  rates for foreigners and natives had 
been increasing, with the rate for foreigners almost doubling  compared  to  
that  for  natives  (Kahanec,  Zaiceva,  &  Zimmermann, 
2009). 
The impact of a high unemployment  rate has been affecting the 
Spanish economy. In the beginning of 2010, more than 1 million households 
(1,220,000 households) have all of their active memb rs on unemployment 
rolls. For some immigrant  individuals,  labor mobility became a constant, 
moving from industry to another in order to survive with the economic crisis. 
Pajares  (2009)  considered  that unemployment  and the economic  
crisis have significantly deteriorated the living conditions of many foreign 
residents due to  the  higher  rates  of  irregularity  and  employment  in  the  
informal  economy, which has limited their ability o access unemployment  
benefits.  The crisis has made it more difficult  for immigrant  labor to renew  
their work permits  and to meet  rent  or  mortgage  payments  in  shared  
homes.  The  living  conditions  of immigrant  communities  are expected  to 
get worse  when  more foreign  workers run out of unemployment benefits. The 
economic crisis is affecting the Spanish demographic  scenario, causing the 
flows to shift again. According  to data from INE, more individuals are 
leaving Spain than moving to it. Net migration in 2011 was reported at 
negative 50,090 people, with 507,740 leaving Spain and 457,650 arriving. 
Under this financial crisis, Spain appeared to be entering in a new 
phase of  international  migratory  patterns.  Spain  is  once  again  becoming  
a  sending country,  and to some  degree,  Latin  America  is playing  a key 
role in this new 
scenario (Urso and Schuster, 2013). According to INE, more than 15,000 
Spanish individuals had left their country to establish residence in Latin 
America in 2011. 
Latin America offers a stronger economy for Spanish mmigrants, 
most of them with relatively high levels of education and professional 
qualifications. Approximately  57% of the Spanish  population  overseas  (1 
million  individuals) chose  Latin  America  as  their  primary  destination.  
Argentina,  Venezuela  and Brazil  accounted  for  more  than  300,000  
Spaniards.  The  additional  incentives include:  a  common  language,  
historical  and  cultural  ties,  and  the  continued presence of family and 
friends who emigrated in past generations and stayed as permanent residents. 
Latin America has historically played an important role in Spain’s migratory 
cycles—both as a sender and as a recipient. 
Germany   is  also  experiencing   new  immigration   flows  from  Spain. 
Highly  qualified  immigrants  from  Southern  Europe  had  been  arriving  to  
the country  in  the  search  of  new  opportunities.  Most  of  the  Spanish  
immigrants arriving to Germany are young, well educated and multilingual. 
They recognized the negative economic and labor prospects at their homeland 
and decided to move abroad   (Urso   and   Schuster,   2013).   These   new   
migrant   patterns   observe similarities  to  those  conformed  half-century  ago.  
In  the  1960s,  guest  workers from  Southern  Europe,  and  particularly  Spain,  
were  the  first  large  immigrant group to move to West Germany looking for 
better job opportunities. Now a new generation of labor migrants is arriving to 
Germany, due to a lack of job positions and opportunities that their native land 
cannot provide. 
Migration    from    Spain    has   specific    characteristics;    high    skilled 
individuals   are   entering   the   German   labor   market   to   work   in   
university laboratories, research centers and high-tec  companies (OECD, 
2009). Instead of applying to jobs others are not willing to do, they are 
moving into spaces where human capital is needed. Immigrants who came to 
Germany in the past were significantly  less  qualified  than  those  who  chose  
other  countries  as  their  new homes. 
In the context of the crisis, the demand from the Spanish labor market 
is for fewer and more specialized workers. Maybe thmajor challenge in 
arriving at an assessment of the impact of the economic crisis on 
international  migration is the  lack  of  dependable  and  timely  data.  Many  
data  remains  unknown,  but preliminary  data  is already  emerging  from  
national  and  international organizations that allow some tentative 
considerations to be made. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The global financial crisis led to a credit crunch globally, although in 
developed countries it was deeper. Despite having started in the housing 
sector in the US, in 2009 most developed countries had a sharp drop in 
production. And Europe was no exception, with several variations, but all of 
the countries in the EU registered an economic contraction. 
The launch of the euro led to a convergence  in the risk associated 
with the bonds  of the euro  zone  governments.  The global  financial  crisis  
led to an 
  
premium,  mainly  in  peripheral  European  countries.  In  2010,  a sovereign  
debt crisis began in the euro zone and some countries were bailed out, like 
Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Greece and recently Cyprus. This crisis was not 
anticipated by the European institutions so they created new tools that would 
help the economic governance of the euro zone, most n tably: the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance, the ESM, the establishment of the 
Troika and a new temporal function de facto of the ECB (the unlimited 
purchase of government debt in the secondary market.) 
The crisis increased sovereign debt of countries like Greece, Portugal, 
Spain,  Ireland,  and  Cyprus,  causing  such  countries  to  request  bailouts.  
The bailouts came conditioned to austerity policies of public spending cuts and 
tax increases,  which  would  cause  even  steeper  drop  in  economic  
activity.  The economic consequence of the financial risis was that the 
unemployment rate in countries such as Spain (27.17%) and Greece (24.5%) 
increased to historic levels, which has led to social d scontent. 
The  financial  crisis  caused  a  poor  economic  performance  in  the  
EU Member States, which led to alternation of political parties in governments 
where elections were held, as in the case of France and the UK, among 
others. Also in some  cases,  the economic  impact  of he crisis  led to call 
snap elections,  as in Spain and Greece,  while in Italy, with a high risk 
premium,  the former  Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was forced to 
resign to give way to a technical government headed by Mario Monti. 
The financial crisis has had two main consequences  on migration.  
The first is that migration to peripheral European countries began to decline 
and has even  taken  place  the  phenomenon  of  return,  due  to  the  high  loss  
of  jobs  in countries like Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Italy. The 
second consequence is that internal migration has increased in the EU, because 
it has increased the movement of people from European peripheral countries to 
Germany. 
The financial crisis in Europe has lasted for more than four years, 
unemployment has increased mainly in the peripheral countries, there was an 
alternation  of  political  parties  in  government  and  increased  internal  
migration within Europe. Finally, the financial crisis has led to an unfinished 
institutional change in the EU, which has been the result of different 
preferences on economic austerity. The Franco-German  xis has been 
reconfigured, because some fissures have  been  generat d  as  a  result  of  the  
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